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EAGCP Commentary on Rescue & Restructuring Aid Guidelines 
 
R&R Aid provides state financial assistance to an individual firm which ‘is unable, 
whether through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its 
owner/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which without outside intervention by 
public authorities will almost certainly condemn it to go out of business in the short or 
medium term’.1  
 
Parts I and II of this report set out the economic context in which the Guidelines on 
R&R Aid must sit.  What is the role of exit/bankruptcy in the competitive process?  
Can we identify biases that lead to too much exit too soon?  Part III examines some of 
the main arguments used to justify R&R aid, and Part IV provides advice on revisions 
to the Guidelines. 
 
 
I Competition, Exit and Productivity Growth  
 
The economic role of loss-making 
 
It is helpful to distinguish factors that affect all firms in an industry from those which 
affect specific firms.  R&R aid is directed at individual firms, so it is firm-specific 
factors that are most important in this context.  Nevertheless, it will often be the case 
that an industry-wide factor affects firms differentially, perhaps because of their 
particular market niche, quality or nimbleness in response.  
 
There are many reasons why a once-profitable firm may become loss-making, but 
they generally fall under two headings: increase in relative costs; or loss of demand.  
If a firm fails to reduce its costs in line with its rivals or sees its costs grow out of line, 
it will eventually find itself unprofitable and in financial distress.  The inability to sell 
for a price in excess of costs is the essential market signal that the firm’s resources 
would be better used elsewhere (or that an inefficient senior management team should 
be replaced).2  Similarly, if a particular firm’s product range loses its customer appeal 
relative to that of its rivals, it may become unprofitable.  This is an essential market 
mechanism by which customer preferences drive the pattern of production.  Firms 
must adapt to changing tastes or it is right that they should fail.  State subsidies reduce 
incentive for firms to respond speedily to the essential market signal that is provided 
by the prospect of financial distress. 
 
                                                 
1
 Paragraph 9 of current Guidelines; OJ 1.10.2004. 
2
 When a firm operates in several product or geographic markets, a loss incurred in one may potentially 
contaminate the performance of another business within the same legal entity.  If a firm operating in 
reasonably profitable market A is also incurring a loss in market B of such a magnitude that the 
combined position is loss-making (e.g. a firm with a stable domestic business may have been unable to 
control its costs when investing heavily overseas), the appropriate response is either to sell (to a better 
or more appropriate management team) or to close business B.  If a sale can be made at a non-negative 
price or if the business can be closed with asset sales in excess of liabilities, there should be no 
contamination and no substantial problem for business A.  If this is not the case, the perfectly good 
business A could be left with a burdensome debt.  However, this situation should spur a negotiated re-
financing as creditors have an interest in supporting business A if it has a positive on-going value and 
there is no benefit to creditors from unduly hampering it. 
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In the case of an industry-wide downturn in demand (or increase in costs relative to 
customer willingness to pay), and in the presence of some degree of economies of 
scale, a shrinking market will support fewer firms in the long run.  The speed and 
order of exit depends on relative efficiencies and scale (e.g. inefficient firms exit first 
and if two firms have the same costs the larger one will reduce its size first).3  This 
natural order can be distorted by financial subsidies which could allow either an 
inefficient business to survive the competitive (evolutionary) war of attrition at the 
expense of a more efficient one, or a larger firm to maintain its scale at the expense of 
a smaller one.4   
 
We conclude that loss making is the essential market signal that resources are 




Thus, loss-making and exit are an essential part of the competitive process.  Actual 
R&R aid directly intervenes in this by delaying the exit of firms receiving the subsidy.  
Post-aid, this results in a higher market share for the subsidised firm at the expense of 
its unsubsidised rivals.   This has an impact on productivity and the distribution of 
employment.   In most cases, the consequence for rivals is that they will see their 
output and employment fall.  One possible exception is when the failure of one firm 
results in a loss of consumer confidence in the market as a whole.  A particular 
example might arise with a bank failure, which panics customers of other banks into 
withdrawing deposits and so create a generalised liquidity crisis.5 
 
The future prospect of R&R aid also has important indirect effects on the incentives 
faced by firms across the market.  First, inefficient firms who anticipate a financial 
safety net will take greater risks, which will in turn precipitate more such crises.  
Second, efficient rivals which do not anticipate having to call on R&R aid can expect 
to face a more reckless inefficient rival whose demise will be slowed down by an 
injection of state aid.  Consequently, the efficient firm might invest more 
conservatively.  This anticipation effect shifts market shares from more efficient to 
less efficient firms even before any financial crisis. 
 
We conclude that actual and prospective R&R aid has far-reaching adverse 
effects on business behaviour beyond the narrow confines of the local aid 
decision. 
 
In order to provide some context for the positive effects of exit, next we summarise 
some evidence on the productivity effects of exit. 
 
                                                 
3
 See: Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) ‘Exit’ RAND Journal of Economics; Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1986) ‘A theory of exit in duopoly’ Econometrica; Whinston (1986) ‘Exit with multiplant firms’ 
RAND Journal of Economics; Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) ‘The evolution of declining industries’ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics; Murto (2004) ‘Exit in duopoly under uncertainty’ RAND Journal of 
Economics. 
4
 Exit can also be delayed by the formation of ‘crisis cartels’ in which illegally colluding firms attempt 
to raise or maintain price to delay or avoid the appropriate market adjustment.  Article 81 rightly 
prohibits such cartels. 
5
 However, in these unusual and special cases, policies other than state aid usually provide a better 
solution as they are less of a ’reward’ for the failing firm (e.g. deposit insurance). 
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Productivity growth and exit 
 
In recent years, there have been major advances in our understanding of the sources of 
productivity growth.  The availability of large scale micro-databases has enabled 
researchers to show that much of aggregate productivity growth results from moving 
market share from less productive to more productive establishments, rather than from 
improvements in the productivity of incumbent establishments.6  Thus, exit (at the 
firm or establishment level) is a major source of productivity growth.  This provides 
empirical support for Schumpeter’s famous argument that the emergence of new 
products and processes, whose success destroys the old, is ‘the essential fact of 
capitalism’.7  He called this the ‘process of creative destruction’. 
 
Focusing on the entry and exit process, the key difference between US and EU 
appears to be that although entry rates are similar, both post entry growth of efficient 
firms and exit of unproductive firms are slower in the EU than the US.  Bartelsman et 
al8 find a similar degree of entry in the EU and US, but show that more efficient US 
establishments are able to grow much more quickly than more efficient EU 
establishments. This suggests that there are barriers to growth and decline in Europe 
that are much stronger than in America.  Part of this could be due to greater resistance 
in Member States against creative destruction as an essential feature of progress, with 
consequences for the overall level of productivity.9 
 
We conclude that intervention in the exit process compromises the driving force 
for productivity growth in Europe. 
 
 
II The Role of Financial Markets 
 
Having developed the role of exit in the competitive process, we next examine 
whether a justification for R&R aid can be found in the failings of financial markets.  
Some such issues are dependent on the details of different national liquidation and 
                                                 
6
 Much of the early work was on the USA and is summarised in Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000) 
‘Aggregate productivity growth: lessons from microeconomic evidence’.  Disney, Haskel and Heden 
(2003) ‘Restructuring and productivity growth in UK manufacturing’ The Economic Journal, July 
Vol.113, provides evidence from the UK.  They find that ‘external’ restructuring (exit, entry and 
market share change), as distinct from ‘internal’ restructuring (improvements by incumbents), accounts 
for 50% establishment labour productivity growth and 80-90% total factor productivity growth.  Much 
of this comes from multi-establishment firms closing poorly performing plants and opening high-
performing new ones. Additionally, external competition is an important determinant of internal 
restructuring. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004) ‘Microeconomic evidence of creative 
destruction in industrial and developing countries’, Discussion Paper 1374, IZA, Bonn, examine 
comparable data for 24 countries, including European (Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Netherlands 
Portugal, Slovenia, UK and West Germany) and North and South American firms.   
7
 Schumpeter (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 
8
 Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2005) ‘Comparative levels of firm demographics and survival’ 
Industrial and Corporate Change. 
9
 An example of this is the retail sector. This industry has been one of the driving forces of the US 
“productivity miracle” since 1995, the acceleration in productivity growth that has not been 
experienced in Europe (see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2007, NBER Working Paper No. 13085). 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizon (2006) “Market selection, reallocation and restructuring in the retail 
sector” Review of Economics and Statistics show that aggregate productivity growth in US retail is 
almost entirely driven by the closure of inefficient stores and the opening up of more efficient stores. 
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reorganisation laws (i.e. bankruptcy law).10  We do not offer a commentary on such 
national idiosyncrasies, other than to suggest that it would be unwise to build EU 
policy around such features.  Instead, we highlight some general threads of analysis. 
 
The starting point is that firms should shut down when they can no longer make an 
economic profit.  A Type 1 error arises if an efficient firm is pushed into bankruptcy 
too soon.  A Type 2 error arises if an inefficient firm continues in business too long.  
Collectively, these two types of error are known as filtering failures.  Additionally, 
there can be inefficiencies if a firm continues to invest in inefficient projects (or fails 
to invest in efficient ones), including if it adopts an investment strategy that is too 
risky.  It is important not to focus on only the Type 1 error as to do so only increases 




The following characteristics are common to most systems.  Investment and 
bankruptcy decisions can be influenced by the existence of different priorities for 
creditors (e.g. suppliers, banks, bond holders, shareholders) and agency issues 
between creditors and managers.  In the event of bankruptcy, there is usually a strict 
priority of creditors, with a status quo of higher priority creditors being paid in full 
before the next priority level until assets are exhausted (this is known as the ‘absolute 
priority rule’).  Limited liability means that shareholders can lose their entire 
investment in a firm but creditors cannot claim against a shareholder’s private assets.  
The supervisory system for managers usually aligns their incentives most closely with 
shareholders.  Because limited liability restricts the consequences for equity holders in 
the event of very bad outcomes, it encourages managers to take more risks (i.e. 
managers do not take creditor losses fully into account).  There is a justification for 
each of these features but this is not the place to develop them.  Instead, we highlight 
some of the consequential biases in relation to exit and reorganisation. 
 
If high priority creditors perceive that the firm is in decline though with a reasonable 
chance of recovery, they may still try to push the firm into bankruptcy so that they can 
be paid off with certainty (i.e. they do not take low priority creditors fully into 
account).  However, there are strong incentives working in the opposite direction.  
Managers may start taking ever increasing risks as bankruptcy looms because by this 
time shareholders can only retrieve their investment if a positive long shot works out.  
Furthermore, firms in difficulty can sometimes borrow by giving the lender first 
creditor priority status to the disadvantage of other creditors.  Overall, the fact that 
firms often enter bankruptcy with far higher liabilities than assets suggests that the 
balance of these biases may be to keep failing firms going longer than is efficient.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 For example: ‘In France, bankruptcy officials appointed to decide whether firms in bankruptcy will 
be liquidated or reorganised have “safeguarding the business” and saving jobs as their primary 
objectives.  However, in the UK and Germany, bankruptcy procedures are more pro-creditor than in the 
US or France and reorganisation is less likely to occur”; Michelle White (2005) ‘Bankruptcy Law’ 
draft chapter for the Handbook of Law and Economics edited by Polinsky and Shavell.  Also, in the US, 
senior managers have the right to file for bankruptcy reorganisation under Chapter 11 as an alternative 
to Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation.  See also White (1989) ‘The corporate bankruptcy decision’ 
Journal of Economic Perspectives and White (2007) ‘Economics of corporate and personal bankruptcy 
law’ entry in New Palgrave Dictionary. 
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Reorganisation bias  
 
When there is an opportunity for reorganisation, this is clearly attractive to both 
managers and shareholders.  The former keep their jobs for longer and the latter can 
normally negotiate away from the absolute priority rule by offering creditors a partial 
payment that might still be more acceptable (e.g. quicker or more certain) than the 
alternative of liquidation.  Such reorganisation possibilities tend to exacerbate the 
above biases and the expectation of state subsidies would further reinforce a bias that 
keeps failing firms in operation too long.11   
 
Other theories do suggest forces that may work in the opposite direction.  For 
example, reorganisation requires the consent of numerous creditors with differing 
priorities, so it is possible that there could be a coordination failure between dispersed 
creditors with diverging interests.  The main issue here is to allow sufficient time and 
create sufficient incentive for creditors to agree.  This should be only a very short 
term problem and so relate only to rescue not restructuring aid. The prospect of the 
latter would only reduce the cost of delayed agreement – so making disagreement 
more likely.  Another argument is that creditors and financial markets do not have all 
the information that managers have as to the continuing viability of a firm.  However, 
it is extremely unlikely that a ministry deciding on state subsidies will have better 
information and so make a better funding decision.  Financial markets and creditors 
have a strong financial incentive to acquire and interpret information accurately.   
 
Overall, while there are theoretical arguments that can conceivably go either way, our 
conclusion is that corporate finance and bankruptcy law do not create a 
fundamental bias that can justify R&R aid.12 
 
 
III Arguments Used in Support of R&R Aid 
 
Having established the deep weakness of attempted justifications for R&R aid on 
efficiency grounds, we turn to some of the main justifications that are offered by 
Member States.  These include social (or ‘equity’) issues.  In our analysis, we build on 
two themes we have been developing.  First, there are indirect effects of aid.  If a firm 
expects R&R aid in the event of it getting into financial difficulties, this weakens its 
incentives to avoid such difficulties in the first place (e.g. taking undue investment 
risks or conceding unrealistic wage claims).  Second, for most economics-based 
justifications, there are other interventions that are typically better placed to solve the 




The closure of a large business can have a significant local impact, particularly on 
employment and with knock-on effects on other local businesses.  This may properly 
be a justification for some form of aid to ease transition.  However, it is unlikely that 
                                                 
11
 Writing about the US system, White (2007, p.5) concludes: ‘many firms that reorganise under 
Chapter 11 end up requiring additional financial restructuring within a short period.  This is consistent 
with the theoretical prediction that too many financially distressed firms reorganize’. 
12
 We note that even if this was not the case for a particular Member State, the appropriate intervention 
would be to reform bankruptcy law, not to use R&R aid with all its distortionary effects on competition. 
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R&R Aid will be the best form of targeting such aid, not least because much of it may 
go to help creditors outside the region.  Even taking only local issues into 
consideration, it will normally be far better to subsidise retraining, infrastructure 
and/or new investment in the region, and not to subsidise an ailing firm.  Furthermore, 
we note that most R&R aid cases are not in deprived areas.  There are twice as many 
rescue cases outside assisted areas as there are in them, and 50% more restructuring 
cases are not in assisted areas as are in them.13  Note also that if the regional economy 
is bouyant, R&R aid adds to labour scarcity in other related sectors of the region, 
 
Danger of systemic failure 
 
In section I, we noted the possibility that there may be some exceptional cases, 
particularly in financial markets where consumer confidence is crucial, where the 
failure of one firm may have a negative externality on its rivals (i.e. in contrast to the 
usual positive externality).  In markets where this argument has validity, there is 
usually a financial regulator (e.g. national central bank) which oversees the market.  If 
the regulator fails in its supervisory role, there may be a case for carefully controlled 
R&R aid.  We can think of no other significant set of markets where this argument is 
likely to be valid.  Furthermore, this exceptional feature of banking markets is best 
addressed by other solutions that can avoid a crisis (e.g. mandatory deposit insurance), 
not R&R aid in the heat of a crisis. 
 
Reduction in the number of firms below the ‘competitive’ level 
 
It might be claimed that the exit of one firm may leave too few in the market to 
compete effectively.  This argument confuses competition with competitive outcomes.  
If there is fierce competition, or if one firms is driven to innovate successfully, then a 
less efficient rival may have to exit.  This is a sign of an efficient market.  Article 82 
is there to protect against situations of anti-competitive foreclosure (predation).   In 
cases where there is no exclusionary behaviour by a dominant firm,  competitive 
dynamics of the market are good for consumers and should not be discouraged by 
protecting rivals against the consequences of competition. 
 
Global competition when extra-EU rivals have access to subsidies  
 
If one country is subsidising a global competitor, the strategic trade policy literature 
suggests that there may be an incentive for counter-subsidies if that would shift profits 
to its ‘national champion’.  There are numerous caveats to this argument, but one 
relevant point in the context of R&R aid is that this aid is not administered when there 
is a possibility of shifting profits.  On the contrary, the aid is given when there are 
losses so it becomes a strategic loss shifting argument, which cannot be beneficial..  
Nevertheless, if it was thought that external subsidies were being used in a predatory 
manner, and would disappear in the event of exit by the European firm, there is a 
potential justification for intervention.  However, that intervention would be much 
better targeted by bilateral negotiation or using anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
external trade measures.  These have much more attractive properties in that they can 
bring about a reduction or elimination of the extra-EU subsidy and they do not have a 
negative externality on other EU firms. 
                                                 
13
 London Economics (2004) ‘Ex post evaluation of state aid’ report for DG Enterprise, Table A3.1. 
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Inasmuch as aid to an SME is less likely to affect cross-border trade, it is unlikely to 
have some of the harmful externalities described above.  Nevertheless, it may delay 
the selection of the best from a group of SMEs fighting to grow and succeed in the 
market.14  Slower exit also leaves less room for new entry.  Since the current de 
minimis rule operates on an absolute size threshold, this would seem to be a roughly 
appropriate way to deal with the lower likelihood of harm.  It is currently quite low, 
but great caution should be exercised before raising it because to do so might interfere 
further with the essential Schumpeterian process of competition. 
 
“R&R Aid is fine because it has helped firms survive in identifiable cases”15 
 
This argument is clearly flawed.  Even if it appears to work for the subsidised firm, 
this may be at the expense of others.  Also, the firm may well have survived in the 
absence of aid, or even avoided the financial difficulty in the first place.  Furthermore, 
the aid may have allowed an inefficient firm to survive at the expense of a more 
efficient potential entrant.  Nevertheless, it is quite possible that there have been some 
cases where the aid has beneficially helped an efficient firm survive.  However, such 
examples must be set against the almost certainly larger number of cases where the 
aid has been ill-targeted and caused more harm than good.  There is no positive case 
for aid based on oversimplified precedent. 
  
A note on gainers and losers from ‘equity’ arguments 
 
The above arguments suggest that the least harmful arguments for R&R aid are based 
in equity arguments (e.g. local unemployment).16  It must be appreciated, however, 
that this does not mean local workers are necessarily the greatest beneficiaries, as a 
financial injection (e.g. a grant, tax exemption or soft loan) most immediately benefits 
shareholders, who are unlikely to be located in a disadvantaged region.  It also 
imposes costs on taxpayers whose money is being given away.  Furthermore, there is 
a substantial deadweight loss in the form of distortions across the economy created by 
the tax system.  Finally, there are political economy reasons (e.g. lobbying and 
political pressure according to where swing voters are located) which distort the 
allocation of aid such that it is not necessarily the most worthy firms/areas that are 
likely to received R&R aid – in the absence of tightly specified rules focusing on the 
                                                 
14
 Recall the evidence on productivity growth, discussed at the end of secton I, which shows that a 
difference between Europe and the USA is that successful American entrants grow more quickly than 
in Europe and unsuccessful entrants exit. 
15
 Two reports by London Economics (2004 and 2005) for the Commission have examined the success 
or otherwise of recent R&R Aid cases.  They find that only a third of the 71 cases they looked at (1995-
2002) survived to 2003 with unchanged status, a third ceased trading and a third were acquired by other 
companies or changed their name.  This is not a very impressive success rate.  In terms of predictability, 
survival is more likely when a pre-aid market decline was followed by post-aid sector growth – 
financial factors were found to be poor predictors. In other words, growth (luck?) seems to be more 
important than aid. 
16
 This is also the aid most consistent with the Treaty Art.87(3)(a): aid to promote the economic 
development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious 
underemployment. 
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economic justification for aid, it is the ones with the most powerful political lobby, 
and not the ones with the best economic justification, that will receive R&R aid.17 
 
 
IV Revisions to the Guidelines 
 
The key elements of the existing guidelines should continue in place, in particular:  
 
Rescue aid should be: restricted to the amount needed to keep the firm in business; for 
a maximum of 6 months; warranted on the grounds of social difficulties; have no 
adverse effects on the industrial situation in other Member States; reimbursed within 6 
months; and “one time, last time” principle applied. 
 
Restructuring aid should be: restricted to the amount needed to keep the firm in 
business; based on a clear and approved plan which is monitored and implemented in 
full; extremely tightly controlled, particularly with respect to firms that are not SMEs 
or firms in assisted regions; and “one time, last time” principle applied.  State aid to 
cover the social costs of restructuring, and which does not involve financial assistance 
directly to the firm in difficulty, should be viewed favourably.  We discuss 
‘compensatory measures’ below. 
 
However, certain aspects of the guidelines need clarifying and tightening. 
 
 
Rescue versus restructuring aid 
 
The characteristics of rescue aid, in particular the six-month limit and requirement to 
repay loans, mean that it is less likely to impose substantial negative externalities than 
restructuring aid.  The main issues we have relate to restructuring aid. 
 
 
Essential need for a properly justified economic case 
 
An effective policy that does not damage the crucial role of exit in the competitive 
process must have the following characteristics: 
 
1. Intervention must be based on an identifiable economic case explaining the 
equity (or, exceptionally, efficiency) justification for R&R aid.  This should 
include a precise explanation of why general government policies (e.g. 
employment or regional) and private finance cannot remedy the problem that 
would be created by not pumping aid into the firm in financial difficulty.  This 
requires a clearly defined counterfactual.  
2. The economic case must not be speculative – the firm and State ministry must 
be able to identify and prove the inequity (or, exceptionally, inefficiency) in 
order to take an appropriate course of action.  Proof should be based on solid, 
cogent and convincing evidence. 
                                                 
17
 A good review of the academic literature on some of the issues in this paragraph can be found in D. 
Spector, 2007, ‘State aids: economic analysis and practice in the EU’ (paper presented at IESE 
Barcelona conference on Fifty Years of the Treaty). 
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3. The Commission must then weigh the costs of intervention (some of which are 
identified earlier in this commentary) against the gains claimed by the State 
ministry.  This must include an evaluation of the implications on other 
interested parties.  Importantly, this should include the market’s customers as 






Two types of issue need addressing. First, what would happen to the firm’s assets if 
no aid were granted?  Second, what would be the social implications for the locality 
of any sudden loss of jobs? 
• Assets: in cases where restructuring aid is meaningful (i.e. at least some part of 
the firm can profitably operate in the medium term) it is often the case that 
some of the bankrupt firm’s assets will be purchased and used by another firm.  
For example, a factory may continue in operation under new ownership, or the 
new owner may buy only the brand name and transfer production elsewhere.  
Evidence should include failed attempts to sell the assets to other firms with a 
capacity to operate them efficiently. 
• Equity issues: inasmuch as employment is expected to fall in a local area, it is 
necessary to identify re-employment and mobility prospects.  All economic 
progress requires change, so the counterfactual should identify why this 
situation would be particularly inequitable.  Evidence should include local 
unemployment rates, lack of success in local job creation and relative 
weakness of employment and regional policies. 
 
 
Burden of proof 
 
The firm in difficulty (in relation to the assets) and Member State (in relation to 
equity issues) are best placed to provide the information necessary to prove a 
counterfactual (against a status quo that the future of the firm should be left to 
competitive market forces).   The Commission is best placed to ‘market test’ the 
impact of the aid, particularly on customers and other firms in the market (which may 
lose market share or even find themselves in difficulty).  The Commission must be 
aware of the full political economy pressures that will inevitably be at work (e.g. 
customers may be pleased to have a subsidised input, horizontal rivals will have their 
own agenda and taxpayers may be poorly represented in the crisis).  
  
 
Compensatory measures  
 
‘Compensatory’ measures are intended to ameliorate distortions to competition 
resulting from a firm receiving aid.  They include requirements such as divestitures, 
capacity reduction and production caps. They are set out in #38-42 of the current 
guidelines, but the underlying reasoning needs clarification, not least because they 
appear to be required as a means of ‘compensating’ rivals and not for helping 
consumers.  From the latter perspective, it seems odd that the Commission should 
facilitate output restrictions and capacity reductions – activities which would rightly 
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be harshly treated as a hard-core cartel in any other circumstances!  On the other hand, 
from the perspective of a more efficient rival, the absence of ‘compensation’ would 
substantially distort competition because of the simultaneous injection of aid.  This 
ambiguity could lead to confusion and bad decisions.  The tension with respect to 
compensatory measures comes from two conflicting pressures.  First, for the 
pervasive reasons we set out in section I, restructuring aid distorts competition and 
inevitably has undesirable side effects – it would be optimal to accept the prohibition 
in Art.87(1) and address equity issues by other instruments (e.g. helping redundant 
workers directly rather than by subsidising shareholders).  Second, if the reality is that 
some restructuring aid is to be allowed, then the rules should be written so as to 
minimise the damage – this is the role of compensatory measures.   
 
The aim, then, is to limit the moral hazard problems and competitive externalities 
discussed in sections I and II.  One way of achieving this is to place compensatory 
measures in the context of the counterfactual – R&R aid should be seen as facilitating 
a smooth transition to the market outcome (i.e. the counterfactual).  This provides a 
level of incentive compatibility for the firm and Member State to reveal the true 
degree of distress.  If the counterfactual is that few of the firm’s assets would be 
reused in the market, then more aid may be allowed but only alongside strong 
‘compensatory’ measures (including closure).  On the other hand, if the counterfactual 
includes substantial re-use of assets under a different management team, then  both 
aid and ‘compensation’ should be very limited as a healthy firm can survive.18  This 
‘compensation’ mechanism provides a disincentive for the firm to request, and the 
Member State to grant, inappropriately high levels of aid. 
 
If the aid package includes an increase in the extent of state ownership (e.g. the 
restructuring may include an injection of capital in return for an equity stake), it 
should be a standard requirement that such stakes should be privatised within a short 
and tightly specified time limit and without a bias that would reward those associated 
with the original distress.  More generally, ‘compensation’ may also be required from 
the Member State (see #46; e.g. opening up a regulated market to competition, or 
privatisation of a state owned enterprise).  To the extent that these measures are 
sensible, of course, they should ideally be implemented independently of a financial 
crisis in a related firm.  Nevertheless, political economy considerations may mean the 
benefits can be brought forward and wherever possible such measures should be 
encouraged.19 
 
In conclusion, it is appropriate that compensatory measures should be seen as a 
punishment for the managers and owners of a firm in difficulty (and possibly also the 
Member State), because this provides a deterrent to firms sliding into difficulties or 
asking for, and Member States granting, R&R aid.  The overarching aim of the 
revised Guidelines should be to minimise efficiency distortions and encourage the use 
of alternative measures to address equity issues. 
  
                                                 
18
 Of course, this assumes that R&R aid is justified in the first place. 
19
 To the extent that such requirements are anticipated, they may influence a Member State to hold 
some regulatory ‘hostages’ to be used judiciously to throw into the pot when a national champion 
demands R&R Aid.  Needless to say, such strategic behaviour should be strongly discouraged. 
